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Abstract: 
John Hay was one of Britain’s leading colonial capitalists, building his 
career from the 1900s to the 1960s in Malaya’s plantation industry. He 
became the leading spokesperson for the British rubber growers, and 
played a major role in the formulation of international restriction schemes 
during the 1930s.  Hay was a remarkable entrepreneurial talent, 
consolidating his corporate power through the premiere Malayan agency 
house, Guthrie & Co. This in itself challenges the notion that Britain’s 
myriad of ‘free-standing’ companies, which were typical of direct 
investment in the Empire, represented a relatively weak and unsustainable 
form of multinational enterprise. But Hay’s dominance of the Malayan 
plantation sector also questions the notion of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ as 
the driving force behind the expansion and sustenance of the British 
imperial system. Hay’s network of colonial corporate influence did not 
extend into the corridors of ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ power in Whitehall and 
the City, where he often had frosty relations. Ultimately, it was the 
financial sector in London that brought about Hay’s forced resignation from 
Guthrie in 1963. Examining questions of class, ethnicity, personality, 
ideology and strategy, the article focuses on why Hay did not develop 
better relations with commercial, financial and official elites, issues that 
would also engender tensions with the post-colonial political and business 
leadership of Malaya/Malaysia. 
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‘Ungentlemanly capitalism’: John Hay and Malaya, 1904-
19641 
In putting the metropole back at the heart of analyses of the expansion, 
maintenance and contraction of the British Empire, Cain and Hopkins 
identified ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ as the essential engine. ‘Gentlemanly 
capitalists’ inhabited an overlapping milieu of elite military, political, 
bureaucratic and financial-cum-commercial circles.  In a non-Marxist analysis 
of wealth creation and political influence, Cain & Hopkins stressed culture and 
connections rather than accumulation alone as the source of power. 
Consequently, low-born and geographically-distanced manufacturers were at 
a distinct disadvantage because they lacked social capital. Business success in 
Empire was culturally constructed. Influence, according to Cain & Hopkins, 
derived from making the right kind of money - in finance and services, not 
secondary production. The closer that business activity aped an aristocratic 
life-style the better – hence, the attraction of agricultural plantations overseas, 
which were revealingly called ‘estates’. The ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ paradigm 
was a shrewd means of making economic history relevant in the age of the 
viciously anti-materialist ‘linguistic turn’. Cain & Hopkins also offered a 
timely, de rigueur explanation of the late-twentieth century eclipse of 
northern UK industry by the outward-facing British financial and services 
sector headquartered in the ‘Square Mile’ of the City of  London.2   
However, the rise of John George Hay, a leading colonial capitalist, sits 
incongruously in the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ frame. Born in 1883, Hay became 
Britain’s leading rubber baron from the early-1930s to the early-1960s. His 
plantation interests were concentrated in Malaya (today’s West or peninsular 
Malaysia), a territory fast-becoming an Empire gem by the end of the First 
World War, given a massive US dollar surplus from the export of highly-
prized strategic raw materials. The Malay Peninsula received levels of UK 
investment far above any other British tropical territory. In the post-1945 era, 
British Southeast Asia became more important to Britain in financial terms 
than even India: according to Foreign Office estimates, the annual return on 
investments from Malaya and Borneo for 1951-4 was over £11.2 million 
compared to £8.8 million from the newly-independent Commonwealth 
country. India’s surplus with the dollar area in 1954 was £6million compared 
to the Malayan area’s £37 million.3 Yet, John Hay, the new jewel in the 
1 I am indebted to John Gullick and Mark Gent (both now sadly deceased), in the 
research and writing of this paper. It has also benefitted immensely from the comments 
of two anonymous reviewers. All errors of fact or interpretation remain the author’s.  
2 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd edition, Harlow: 
Longman, 2001.  
3 J. H. Drabble, Malayan Rubber: the Interwar Years, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991, 144, 
157, 167, 169, 181; R. B. Smith, ‘Some Contrasts between Burma and Malaya in British 
Policy in South-East Asia, 1942-1946’ in  R. B. Smith and A. J. Stockwell (eds), British 
Policy and the Transfer of Power in Asia: Documentary Perspectives, London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 1988, 32, 47-8, 69;  The National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (hereafter TNA), FO 371/123251, ‘UK Economic Interests in the Far East, 
South East Asia and South Asia, 1955, Revised’, note by Foreign Office Research 
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2 | P a g e
crown’s leading entrepreneur, was far from being a ‘gentlemanly capitalist’. 
Self-educated and from impecunious Scottish origins, Hay worked his way up 
from the Accounts Department of Guthrie & Co. to become managing director 
of the premiere Malayan agency house in 1930. Three years’ earlier, Hay 
estimated that the capital administered and controlled by Guthrie enjoyed a 
market value of about £16 million, and Guthrie’s associated companies as a 
group constituted the second largest producer of rubber in the world.4 
Although knighted in 1939 (and a director of the Mercantile Bank of India 
after 1941), Hay achieved remarkable business success without close links to 
the City or cosy relations with the state. Sir John frequently clashed with the 
imperial and colonial authorities on the future of the rubber industry, and on 
economic policy for Malaya generally. At the same time, Hay’s lack of 
integration into charmed City circles proved his downfall, culminating in his 
deposition from Guthrie in December 1963. He died five months later.  
In terms of organisational forms, Hay’s career points to a consolidation of 
corporate power through a colonial agency house (alternatively known as a 
merchant firm or a trading company), independent of both City of London 
and imperial government mediation. The analysis presented here permits 
further modification of the ‘free-standing company’ model developed by 
Wilkins.5  This ‘typical mode of British direct investment abroad’, which 
‘spread in the High Age of Imperialism, when the “Sun Never Set on the 
British Empire”’, involved minimalist head office structures in London 
supervising substantial assets overseas.6 It was a system of surplus capital 
capture and deployment which was prevalent in the development of Malayan 
plantation companies from the 1900s.7 But, as Wilkins herself acknowledged, 
this mass of apparently autonomous and relatively small joint-stock, limited-
liability companies was in reality clustered together through inter-locking 
directorships and cross-shareholdings, as well as management and supply 
contracts, controlled by the agency houses. As such, ‘the rubber-plantation 
companies... might not be considered free-standing at all’.8  
‘[O]verlapping circles of individuals and enterprises’ were clearly 
characteristic of the Guthrie Group under Hay’s direction.9 Like its arch rival 
in the Malayan plantations, Harrisons & Crosfield (H&C), the Guthrie 
‘business group’ constituted ‘a “network” form of international business 
Department, 23 November 1956, tables D and E. These figures do not include returns 
from the oil companies which could not be territorially divided.  
4 Guthrie Archive, School of Oriental and African Studies, London (hereafter GA), 
G/MIS/9, Hay to Lady Anderson, 27 April 1927.  
5 Mira Wilkins, ‘The free standing-company, 1870-1914: an important type of British 
foreign direct investment’, Economic History Review, 41, 2 (1988): 259-282; idem., ‘The 
Free-Standing Company Revisited’, in Mira Wilkins and Harm Schröter (eds), The Free-
Standing Company in the World Economy, 1830-1996, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998, 3-64.  
6 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 261; Wilkins, ‘Revisited’, 11.  
7 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 264; Wilkins,  ‘Revisited’, 20-1. 
8 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 265, 268-9; Wilkins, ‘Revisited’, 6, 14, 56 
n. 87.  
9 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 265 
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organisation’. Guthrie, in line with H&C, ‘was the core company joined 
through a variety of financial, trading and contractual relationships with a 
much wider network of firms’.10 Moreover, the longevity and continued 
entrepreneurial dynamism of this network structure, well into the post-1945 
era, suggests that this was not an inferior form of multinational business 
management as compared with the supposedly better-integrated and better-
managed American model (as Wilkins suggests).11 Nevertheless, Hay’s 
network was not ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ in nature because it did not develop 
robust relationships with Whitehall or the City. In the case of the leading 
financial institutions of London, Hay’s personal dominance of the Guthrie 
Group came to be seen as an impediment to efficient management by the 
1960s.   
To plug the gaps in the Guthrie archive held at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies in London, particularly with regard to correspondence outside 
the 1920s and 1930s, a variety of official and business records, as well as 
references to Hay in the existing secondary literature, are drawn upon in this 
article.  This material was cross-checked and triangulated with some insightful 
personal reminiscences shared with the author. The correspondents, who had 
worked closely with Sir John, were asked to focus specifically on the key 
theme of this paper: why was Hay was incapable of developing better relations 
with commercial, financial and official elites? Although this ‘failing’ can be put 
down to ethnic and class prejudice, we also need to examine Hay’s complex 
personality. At the same time, however, we need to investigate more than 
issues of character, and the analysis presented here is set within the wider 
context of the business-government relations of late-colonialism. Hay’s frosty 
relations with the state underline the ideological gulf which was opening up 
between imperial business and imperial governance by the late-colonial era. 
Even under the rubber restriction schemes of the 1930s, Hay furiously 
disagreed with senior Colonial Office (CO) mandarins. After the Second World 
War, discourses on reconstruction, and the general issue of state intervention 
in Malayan economic development, exacerbated these differences. Moreover, 
Sir John’s stubborn commitment to the ‘open’ economy would also engender 
tensions with the Federation’s post-colonial political and business leadership.   
‘It’s a hard life if you don’t weaken’12: Hay’s Curriculum Vitae 
John Hay has been described as one of the ‘most able British entrepreneurs of 
the period’.13  Hay had arrived on the international rubber scene by 1922 when 
10 Geoffrey Jones and Judith Wale, ‘Diversification strategies of British trading 
companies: Harrisons & Crosfield, c. 1900-c. 1980’, Business History, 14, 2 (April 1999): 
69-101, citation at 74.  
11 Geoffrey Jones and Judith Wale, ‘Merchants as Business Groups: British Trading 
Companies in Asia before 1945’, Business History Review, 72 (Autumn 1998): 367-408;  
Wilkins, ‘‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 264, 269; Wilkins, ‘Revisited’, 21. 
12 A favourite phrase of my Aberdonian grandmother-in-law, Betty Barwise (1916-
2015), and this article is dedicated to her memory.  
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he began regularly attending the council meetings of the London-based 
Rubber Growers’ Association (RGA), the leading lobby for the European-
owned estate side of the industry.14  In 1929, Hay became the RGA’s vice-
chairman. Following a visit to the USA in that year, he reported to the RGA 
Council that ‘it would be wise for producing interests to keep in close touch 
with America, the largest consumer of rubber.’15 
Indeed, Hay was distinctive ‘as the first industry leader to view rubber 
production as a global rather than as a local issue’.16 He was too junior to be 
involved in the making of the Stevenson restriction scheme of 1922 but 
emerged as a vociferous critic of its shortcomings (its British colonial 
unilateralism and the non-participation of the Netherlands East Indies [NEI] 
primarily). He agitated for the scheme’s abolition (achieved finally in 1928), 
convincing the CO and Board of Trade officials of the futility of a system of 
restriction which was not universal.17 As Wall Street crashed, Hay came up 
with a cooperative selling scheme, with the aim of fusing ‘all the [rubber 
growing] groups into one selling unit’.18 By 1930, the idea of a joint marketing 
organisation was superseded by a focus upon an international restriction 
scheme. As RGA chairman, 1930-1, Hay was centre stage in the lobbying of 
imperial and colonial governments and in intra-industry negotiations.19  
Hay continued to play a key role in the formulation of the International 
Rubber Restriction Agreement (IRRA) of May 1934. He held out for a 
comprehensive agreement, encompassing the NEI and other major producer 
territories, thus avoiding the inadequacies of the 1920s restriction debacle.20 
Hay was feted in 1934 by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister, as both ‘architect and builder’ compared to the minister’s role 
as mere ‘builder’s labourer’.21 Hay had ‘converted an atmosphere heavily 
13 Lionel Carter, Chronicles of British Business in Asia, 1850-1960: a bibliography of 
printed company histories with short accounts of the concerns, New Delhi: Manohar, 2002, 
13. 
14 London Metropolitan Archives, Rubber Growers’ Association Council Minutes 
(hereafter RGACM), 24863/10-11, 3 April and 1 May 1922.  
15 RGACM, 24863/26, 3 June 1929, 4. 
16 John Orbell, ‘Hay, Sir John George (1883-1964)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/52620 [accessed 24 June 2014].   
17 Sjovald Cunyngham-Brown, The Traders: a Story of Britain’s South-East Asian 
Commercial Adventure, London: Newman Neame, 1971, 242-3, 253; D. J. M. Tate, The 
RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, 349 n. 3, 360. 
18 RGACM, 24863/27, 18 Nov 1929. 
19 RGACM, 24863/29, 28 July 1930, 6 Oct 1930 (including copy of cablegram to the 
Chairman of the Rubber Industry Committee, Ceylon, Sept 1930), and copy of letter to 
Professor M. W. F. Treub, Ondernemersraad voor Nederlandsch-Indië, The Hague, 26 
Sept 1930. 
20 RGACM, 24863/38, 21 Sept 1933; Tate, RGA, 381-3, Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 145, 
181. 
21 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 259-60. 
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charged with anti-restriction sentiment into one where it found favour’.22 He 
went on to become the most effective member of the International Rubber 
Regulation Committee (IRRC), which executed the agreement’s production 
controls.23 In insisting on Hay’s presence on the IRRC, senior CO civil servant, 
Sir John Campbell, described Hay as ‘head and shoulders above any other 
member of the [RGA] in ability and breadth of view’.24 Hay subsequently 
negotiated the deal of 1937 which kept Thailand within the agreement.25 He 
was knighted in 1939 for these services. During 1940 and 1941, Hay worked on 
the American consumer and the Roosevelt administration. A crucial Allied 
wartime stockpile was thereby established and virtually all Malaya’s rubber 
crop was sold before the Japanese took Singapore in February 1942.26   
Into his sixties, Sir John proved a force in the rehabilitation of Malaya’s 
plantations as head of a joint committee of dispossessed Far Eastern business 
interests in Britain.27 From September 1943, he was one of the two RGA 
representatives in the Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) tasked with overseeing 
the reoccupation of Malaya. Hay subsequently planned and chaired the 
Malayan Rubber Estates Owners Company (MREOC), which oversaw the 
reconstruction of the estates through pooling the resources of the large 
European rubber companies.28 Hay’s role as one of Britain’s leading imperial 
capitalists was confirmed in his membership of the Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee (CEAC), consulting with the Colonial Secretary on 
economic policy matters for the Empire as a whole from 1944-5.29 His position 
as the ‘uncrowned king of the rubber plantation industry’ was reflected in 
Hay’s appointment to the Rubber Consultative Committee (RCC) in London.30 
The RCC brought together the leading British rubber producers, sellers and 
manufacturers with key Whitehall mandarins, given the importance of rubber 
for metropolitan industrial rehabilitation plus the commodity’s global 
significance as the prime dollar-earner of the sterling area in Britain’s post-
war financial crisis.31   
At Guthrie, meanwhile, Hay proved himself an ingenious innovator, ruthlessly 
driving down production costs in the ‘Little’ and ‘Great’ Depressions of the 
1920s and 1930s. This included wage cuts for, and repatriation of, Indian 
labour, retrenchment or salary and allowance cuts for expatriate staff, and the 
22 Tate, RGA, 382. 
23 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 185-6. 
24 Ibid., 182. 
25 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 263; Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 192. 
26 Financial Times, 27 May 1964; Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 265-6, 274; Tate, RGA, 
482-3; Austin Coates, The Commerce in Rubber: The First Two Hundred and Fifty Years, 
Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987, 288-9. 
27 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 282-5. 
28 Nicholas J. White, Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-57, Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996, 65, 67. 
29 TNA, CO 852/588/2, ‘Extract from the minutes of a meeting of CEAC, 19 December 
1944’, reproduced in A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and 
Decolonization, 1938-64, London: Macmillan, 1987, 216. 
30 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 312. 
31 White, Business, 35-6. 
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weeding out of unprofitable trading and distribution businesses to focus on 
the core business of primary production.32 A move of head office in London 
during 1932 was engineered to reduce rents.33 This was strategic cost-cutting, 
however, which minimised disgruntlement amongst the European planters, 
and did not damage productivity: Hay calculated in the early-1930s that the 
younger assistants could find other jobs, while the more well-to-do senior 
managers could exist on their accumulated earnings. He retained instead the 
middle-aged planters ‘with initiative and a name for toughness’.34 Hay had a 
reputation for ‘callous ruthlessness’.35 But he was no believer in economy for 
economy’s sake. As General Manager in 1926, he called for an increase in 
remuneration scales for expatriate staff in Southeast Asia on the grounds that 
‘true economy seldom consists in merely with-holding money, but rather in an 
expenditure of money wisely directed’. The intention was ‘to make the service 
an attractive one, offering ample scope for men of ability and character and 
giving a proper reward for services rendered’.  Nonetheless, ‘there should be 
no mistake, that policy also implies this, that having given these terms, the 
Firm will exact adequate services for them from all men, both in the junior, 
intermediate and senior ranks’. This was a key means of ‘improving a 
profitable business’.36 In the reviving of a tea estate after 1938, Hay advised on 
a ‘judicious adjustment’ of annual bonuses to encourage ‘key members of the 
subordinate [Asian] staff to give of their best’, while warning against ‘false 
economies’ in road- and office-construction. Nor was there any scrimping in 
the provision of a temple and a hospital for the ordinary labourers.37 
Moreover, Hay was prepared to expend resources for Guthrie to diversify  into 
oil palms (and to a lesser extent tin) during the 1920s to reduce the 
dependence upon one export.38 Concurrently, with emerging competition 
from synthetic rubbers, Hay pushed Guthrie’s investment in research, 
focussing, ahead of his time, on the genetics of Hevea Brasiliensis.39 By 1938, 
Guthrie had expanded to 12 times the size it had been when he joined the firm 
in the 1900s – again emphasising that the agency house cluster was not as un-
dynamic or managerially weak as Wilkins suggests, and Guthrie was in line 
here with other British merchant-led business groups in Asia.40 At Malayan 
independence in 1957, Hay’s Guthrie Group lorded over 150,000 acres of 
planted rubber, palm oil and tea, plus two tin mines – an investment stake in 
Malaya estimated at M$300 million (about £35 million or in excess of £775 
32 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 252, 255-7; Tate, RGA, 324-5, 455-6; GA, G/MIS/9, 
enclosure in Hay to Anderson, 2 July 1925; Hay to Robertson, 18 Sept 1930 and 11 June 
1931.   
33 GA, G/MIS/9, Hay to Lady Anderson, 19 Sept 1932.  
34 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 255.  
35 Tate, RGA, 325.  
36 GA, G/MIS/9, Hay to Singapore, 27 May 1926.   
37 Hay to Harry Piper, United Sua Betong Rubber Estates, 16 March, extracted in C. N. 
Parkinson, The Guthrie Flagship: United Sua Betong (ed. and abridged by J. M. Gullick), 
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1996, 106-7.   
38 GA, G/MIS/9, Hay to Lady Anderson, 8 June 1928.  
39 Tate, RGA, 420, 425-6 
40 Ibid., 480; Jones and Wale, ‘Business Groups’ 
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million at 2017 values).41 Some of those assets were indeed vast in scale: as a 
director in the Guthrie stable of companies pointed out in 1958, the Tanah 
Merah rubber estate alone (at about 18,000 acres) covered an area that, if 
transplanted to London, would have its northern corner in Hyde Park in the 
centre of the city and its southern corner in suburban Croydon on the far 
outskirts of the conurbation.42  
Post-1945, to deal with intensified synthetic competition, Hay again turned to 
cost cutting innovations, pioneering replanting of old rubber stands with high-
yielding clones, road and drainage improvements, the standardisation of 
properties in solid and latex rubbers, and the processing of rubber.43 Guthrie 
was also ahead of the game in terms of its oil palm research facilities in 
southern Malaya.  With the closing of the West African Institute for Oil Palm 
Breeding in the 1960s, the Guthrie research organisation was rated the ‘best in 
the world’, making the Group an attractive proposition for take-over as palm 
oil became an increasingly profitable alternative to rubber. Indeed, in 
considering a bid for Sir John’s companies in 1963, the rival Barlow Group 
was primarily interested in acquiring ‘the Guthrie knowhow and the Chemara 
Research Station’, given the ‘very high yielding palms’ which Guthrie was 
breeding.44 Through providing these central services, Guthrie did not 
represent the ‘loose cluster’ of free-standing companies, ‘too partial’ and ‘too 
weak’ to be designated as a ‘multinational enterprise’, which Wilkins viewed 
as typical of British direct foreign investment.45 Guthrie and John Hay, the 
central organisers of the network, provided the ‘entire package, including 
product, process, marketing ability, technological know how, capital, and 
management’ which was true also of ‘the prototype US multinational 
enterprise’.46 The willingness of Guthrie to take a lead in the provision of 
cutting-edge R&D also demonstrated an organisational business form which 
could more than adequately engage ‘with the most advanced technology’ and 
knowledge creation (albeit in agribusiness rather than manufacturing).47 As 
Wilkins admitted: ‘The free-standing companies with their rubber plantations 
in Malaya probably had an advantage over Ford with its rubber plantations in 
Brazil. The former were frequently set up or came to be managed by 
experienced agency houses: they were thus better positioned to draw on 
outsiders’ talents’.48   
Hay was no absentee landlord either – he was a hands-on chief executive, 
making a three-month long visit to Southeast Asia every year to see conditions 
first-hand for himself, not only at the Guthrie branches but on the estates of 
41 Straits Times, 4 Feb 1958; http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-
1633409/Historic-inflation-calculator-value-money-changed-1900.html [accessed 21 
November 2017] 
42 Sir Andrew McFadyean, United Sua Betong: A Retrospect, 1959 reproduced in 
Parkinson, Flagship, 130. 
43 Cunyngham-Brown, 294-5, 304-5 
44 Barlow, 26/1, Hindson to Barlow, 29 July 1963 
45 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 265. 
46 Wilkins pp. 265, 269-70; see also Jones and Wale, ‘Business Groups’, 389, 396, 399-40.  
47 Wikins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 277 
48 Ibid., 21.   
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the ‘free-standing’ companies as well.49 Reports would be compiled on the 
long sea-voyage home, and recommendations fired off to the overseas 
branches on Hay’s return to London. Within the Group itself, Hay’s 
entrepreneurial skills were highly regarded.  In May 1932, a fellow director on 
Guthrie company boards commended Hay’s ‘wonderful penetrating analysis of 
difficult problems’ which he found ‘astonishing’; Hay ‘always look[ed] years 
ahead’. Hay’s ‘selling ability’ was labelled ‘extraordinary’, given that USB’s 
selling price ‘for the past year’ had been ‘considerably higher than the average 
London price’.50  John Gullick, the former Malayan civil servant, who became 
Guthrie’s company secretary in London from 1957-62 emphasised: ‘the sheer 
clarity of his mind [even at 80] and his ability to express a case persuasively 
were remarkable gifts’.51 A ‘lightning intake of information and [a] 
comprehensive grasp of the overall picture’ made Hay an exceptionally 
talented entrepreneur.52 Hay’s canny ability to predict the future was 
illustrated in 1936 when, anticipating a Second World War, secret instructions 
were issued to senior planters to put their estates on a maximum-production 
footing.53 
But Hay was hardly a  ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ - the fusing of aristocracy and 
finance-cum-commercial services, based upon London and the Southeast of 
England, and which, according to Cain & Hopkins, was the central driver in 
the growth, maintenance and retrenchment of the British imperial system. 
Hay was a ‘privately educated’ accountant from an impoverished Scottish 
background.54 John George was the seventh child in a family of ten, his father 
being a village shopkeeper in Fife, who had run into financial difficulties, 
forcing the family to move to Aberdeen. There, Hay went to work in a draper’s 
shop at age seventeen. He obtained an accountancy qualification at night 
school (his only formal qualification), moving on to work as a clerk at 
Aberdeen railway station.  In 1904, the twenty-one year old followed a friend 
to London, and worked his way up through Guthrie from the post of Assistant 
Cashier. He found himself in the newly formed Companies Department at 
Guthrie (of which he eventually became head in 1918). Here, Hay was engaged 
in raising capital through company flotations on the London Stock Exchange 
for the emerging rubber industry.55 Guthrie has indeed been recognised in the 
secondary literature as a leader in the ‘reinvention’ of the  Southeast Asian 
agency houses as they metamorphosed from being principally concerned with 
the import-export trade, and shipping and insurance agencies, into becoming 
managers of fixed investments in primary production.56  
49 Parkinson, Flagship, 104.  
50 W. J. Gallagher at USB AGM, 27 May 1932 quoted in Parkinson, Flagship, 91.  
51 John Gullick, ‘Sir John Hay: A Personal Recollection’, The Planter, 71, 834 (Sept 
1995):439-42, quotation at 440. 
52 Cunyngham-Brown, 224.   
53 Tate, RGA, 481.  
54 The term ‘privately educated’ in Who’s Who etc. indicates an inferior or limited 
education.  
55 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 223-4, 226. 
56 Geoffrey Jones, Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British trading companies 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 69-71.  
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The shift from coffee to rubber as the main plantation crop in early-twentieth 
century Malaya required much larger economic units, and far more capital 
than a proprietary planter could provide.  Hence, rubber estates tended to be 
run by London-registered limited companies – the agency houses bought the 
land and then sold it on to newly floated firms.57 The trading companies 
leveraged on their established links with plantation owners in Malaya ‘prior to 
the advent of rubber-growing’ as suppliers of estate equipment, sellers of 
crops like coffee on a commission basis, and ‘in some cases the provision of 
working capital, particularly during the early stages of the switch to rubber’.58 
Moreover, the agency houses usually retained remarkable influence over the 
new listed outfits, not by directly owning the capital but through controlling 
the management via the provision of secretarial services, as well as on the spot 
expert knowledge of Malayan conditions. The executive directors of rubber 
companies were usually agency house appointees. Via interlocking 
directorships, cross shareholdings, and managerial arrangements, London’s 
mass of supposedly ‘free-standing’ rubber companies were coordinated into a 
dozen or so groups corresponding to agency-house boundaries. Guthrie was 
clearly  much more than a  collection of  ‘brass plate’ firms.59  Moreover, as 
Jones & Wale calculated, Guthrie and H&C, Malaya’s two ‘dominating’ agency 
houses, controlled group assets which made them probably ‘amongst the 
largest’ of British business enterprises in the inter-war years, and certainly 
larger than the British overseas banks in Asia with their more obvious 
connections to ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in the City of London.60
Up to the First World War, Hay became ‘indispensable’ to the Anderson 
family (which owned Guthrie). 61 He put together the prospectuses which 
converted private firms into listed companies. The exemplar was Hay’s 
beloved United Sua Betong (USB), floated in 1909.  Hay became first secretary 
at USB (1911), then director (1919) and chairman (1927 to his death).62 USB 
doubled in size in 1925 through Hay persuading the board to buy the vast 
Tanah Merah tapioca plantation, involving further capitalisation through an 
additional London share issue in which a huge sum of £10 million was 
subscribed.63 A similar pattern followed with numerous other primary 
producing firms in the Guthrie Group – by 1945, Hay sat on the boards of 
twenty-one of these operating units, being chair of thirteen.64  
57 J. M. Gullick, ‘The London Secretary’, The Planter, 74, 862 (Jan 1998): 43-9, citation at 
43-4. 
58 J. H. Drabble and P. J. Drake, ‘More on the Financing of Malayan Rubber, 1905-23’, 
Economic History Review, 27, 1 (Feb 1974): 108-120, p. 113.  
59 Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 264  
60 Jones and Wale, ‘Diversification’, 72; Geoffrey Jones, ‘British Overseas Banks as Free-
Standing Companies, 1830-1996’, in Wilkins and Schröter (eds), Free Standing-Company, 
pp. 350-1, 358.  
61 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 439. 
62 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 228, 232, 242; Parkinson, Guthrie Flagship, 32, 80. 
63 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 245; GA, G/MIS/9, Hay to Lady Anderson, 13 May 1925; 
Parkinson, Guthrie Flagship, 75-6.  
64 Orbell, ‘Hay’; Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 245; White, Business, 40. 
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Table 1: Sir John Hay’s chairmanships of Guthrie Group companies, c. 1945 
Company Name Year of Incorporation 
Linggi Plantations Ltd 1905 
Malacca Rubber Plantations Ltd 1906 
Labu (FMS) Rubber Ltd 1907 
Kamuning (Perak) Rubber and Tin Ltd 1909 
United Sua Betong Rubber Estates Ltd 1909 
Cheviot Rubber Ltd 1910 
KMS (Malay States) Rubber & Coconut 
Plantations Ltd 
1910 
Renong Tin Dredging Company Ltd 1913 
Rembau Jelei Rubber Ltd 1923 
Lambak Rubber Ltd 1923 
Elaeis Plantations Ltd 1924 
Oil Palms of Malaya Ltd 1930 
Ledang Bahru Ltd 1931 
At the apex of these quasi-subsidiaries, Hay had become General Manger of 
Guthrie in 1925 and, up to 1950, was owner of one-sixth of the business.65 
Hay’s companies were further cemented together by cross-shareholdings. For 
example, in the diversification into oil palms after 1924, USB held 20 per cent 
of the authorized capital of £50,000 in Elaeis Plantations, with Linggi 
Plantations and Malacca Rubber being the other substantial shareholders in 
this enterprise. From 1957, USB held 31.5 per cent of Oil Palms of Malaya 
following the latter’s acquisition of Elaeis.66  
Hay was probably uniquely under-privileged at his entrée into the Malayan 
business world – even the famed ‘Scots in the East’ who built the great 
merchant houses of Asia from the early-nineteenth century onwards, though 
financially embarrassed, usually hailed from the gentry class of the Highlands 
not the petty bourgeoisie of the Lowlands.67 Sir John’s wealth accumulation, 
from such lowly beginnings, was impressive – on his death in 1964, he left a 
sizeable fortune of £530,000 (about £10.2 million at 2017 prices).68 
Compared to other rubber entrepreneurs this was a considerable sum – for 
example, Sir Eric Macfadyen of H&C left a mere £47,154 in 1967 (about 
£807,000 at current prices).69 Sir Frank Swettenham, the legendary 
administrator-turned-plantation company director, left £27,000 in 1946 
65 Cunyngham-Brown, 251. 
66 Parkinson, Flagship, 73; McFadyean, USB, 130. 
67 G. Roger Knight, Trade and Empire in Early Nineteenth Century Southeast Asia: Gillian 
Maclaine and his Business Network, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2015,  21, 25, 30-4, 112-3, 114. 
68 Orbell, ‘Hay’.  Current values in the following section are calculated from 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-1633409/Historic-inflation-
calculator-value-money-changed-1900.html [accessed 16 November 2017. 
69 Guy Nickalls, ‘Macfadyen, Sir Eric (1879–1966)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34722, accessed 18 Nov 2014. 
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(about £1.07 million at 2017 values).70 Ship-owners, who as service providers 
are usually seen as making up the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ pantheon, did not 
necessarily accumulate more than Sir John either.71 Sir John Hobhouse, head 
of Liverpool’s Blue Funnel Line in the 1950s, which carried much of Malaya’s 
rubber to western markets, left £133,680 in 1961 (around £2.8 million in 
2017).72 Even Far Eastern financiers, the archetypal ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, 
who underwrote Malaya’s commodity trades, did not outstrip Hay’s earning 
power.73 Sir Arthur Morse, chief executive of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC), 1941-53, left £321,610 in 1967 (approximately 
£5.5 million today).74  
This wealth reflected both the mass of directors’ fees that Hay hoovered up 
through membership and chairmanships of numerous boards, plus the 
cashing in of his one-sixth share in Guthrie in 1950. The latter manoeuvre 
netted him about M$4 million (approaching £470,000 at the time) – a 
massive sum which was testament to the turnaround in Guthrie’s fortunes 
which Hay had engineered from the mid-1920s.75 Yet, Hay’s capacity for 
making money is all the more remarkable given the relatively modest returns 
to investors from Southeast Asian rubber.  Thanks to the vicissitudes of the 
global economy, and the shortcomings of international restriction schemes, 
plantation companies did not necessarily ‘drain’ Malaya’s wealth or make 
excessive profits over the long run.76 Company Secretary Gullick recalled 
correspondence with a butcher, who had inherited some shares from an aunt, 
the widow of a planter: ‘holding shares in a rubber company was rather more 
productive in prizes than Premium Bonds, but what you would get in dividend 
was no less unpredictable’.77 Moreover, as we will see now, Hay achieved great 
wealth without close connections to Whitehall or the City of London.   
Turbulent relations with Whitehall and The City 
Hay was a member of a ‘few respectable clubs’ and ‘went every day for lunch 
in the Gresham Club in the Square Mile, which was rather classier than the 
70 H. S. Barlow, ‘Swettenham, Sir Frank Athelstane (1850–1946)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36387, accessed 18 Nov 2014] 
71 Nicholas J. White and Catherine Evans, ‘Holding Back the Tide: Liverpool shipping, 
gentlemanly capitalism and intra-Asian trade in the twentieth century’, in Ulbe Bosma 
and Anthony Webster (eds), Commodities, Ports and Asian Maritime Trade since 1750, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 221-2.  
72 John Nicholson, ‘Hobhouse, Sir John Richard (1893–1961)’, rev. J. Gordon Read, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33905, accessed 20 Nov 2014] 
73 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 369-80, 605-9.  
74 Frank H. H. King, ‘Morse, Sir Arthur (1892–1967)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/50275, accessed 25 Nov 2014]; 
75 GA, G/MIS/11, Anderson to Hay, 14 April 1950.  
76 Drabble and Drake, ‘Financing’, 116, 119-20. 
77 Gullick, ‘Secretary’, 49 
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City of London club’.78 The choice of the Gresham, however, may have 
reflected the fact that the City of London did not admit drapers – his father’s 
profession.79 Moreover, Hay’s frequenting of gentlemen’s clubs did not result 
in affable relations with the Whitehall civil servants he sometimes dined with. 
In 1937 Sir John Campbell of the CO and chairman of the IRRC described how 
Hay had made him feel ‘like the toad beneath the harrow who knows exactly 
where each prick-point goes!’80 According to Gullick, Hay had a ‘contempt for 
civil servants’, who in contrast to Sir John tended to be Oxbridge educated. 
When Gullick incurred Hay’s displeasure, he would observe to the board that 
the allegedly errant Gullick was ‘not a businessman, but a civil servant’.81 The 
dislike was reciprocated by the patrician mandarins: a Board of Trade official 
commented in 1946 about Sir John’s ‘acid and generally untruthful 
allegations’.82  
There was limited rapport also with fellow London-based rubber barons. The 
long-standing feud with H&C went back to a snub by Sir Eric Miller in the 
inter-war period: ‘Hay is a young man with a lot to learn’ was the reputed slap 
down from the boss of H&C.83 This patronizing attitude was very much a 
response to Hay’s arrogance, his inability to compromise and his disregard for 
the views of others (even early in his career).84 Hay frequently rounded on his 
RGA colleagues in viperous prose, as in 1934 when the association’s Rubber 
Regulation Committee dared to suggest that India be given a larger IRRA 
quota at the expense of Malaya:  
... there appears to be some real misconception regarding some 
very material facts relating to Rubber Regulation... A reopening of 
these complex and difficult problems would necessitate a renewal 
of prolonged negotiations, would create a serious state of 
unsettlement and uncertainty with its unpleasant concomitant of 
lower prices for rubber, and, in the end, would gravely imperil the 
very existence of any agreement for Rubber Regulation... 
When your Committee was formed, I understood that its objects 
and functions were to defend, explain and uphold the Rubber 
Regulation scheme...  To participate in any activities incompatible 
with these purposes may, in my opinion, have consequences 
seriously detrimental to the Rubber Industry.85  
As retiring RGA chairman in 1946, Tom Barlow lamented the failings of the 
MREOC: the board in London ‘was dominated by Hay who insisted upon his 
78 Letter to the author from Mark Gent, 21 April 2003. 
79 Graham Turner, Business in Britain, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, Revised Edition, 
1971, 310.   
80 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 333 n. 178. 
81 Letter from John Gullick to the author, 18 March 2003. 
82 TNA, BT 258/65, note by Caplan, 10 Dec 1946. 
83 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 440. 
84 Tate, RGA, 343. 
85 RGACM, 24863/40, 3 Dec 1934, Report of Rubber Regulation Committee, copy of 
letter from Hay to convenor, 26 Nov 1934.  
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method of doing things, which inevitably led to ill-will and 
misunderstanding.’86  
This lack of collegiality towards competitors was not entirely surprising. But a 
hostile view of Hay also came to prevail amongst ‘gentlemanly’ principals in 
the Square Mile. In dealing with upper-class ‘City types’, Hay did not play by 
the rules of the old-boy network. For example, Sir John would play off the 
Phoenix Assurance Company against Lloyds to get the lowest tender for the 
profitable insurance of the Guthrie enterprise, and switched the contract from 
year to year precisely for that purpose.87 In 1957, he rowed with Howard 
Morford, general manager of the Chartered Bank in London, as a result of 
which a large share of Guthrie’s business which formerly went through 
Chartered was transferred to the Mercantile.88 At the Mercantile, meanwhile, 
he applied himself to his duties as deputy chairman (1952-4) with rather more 
rigour than the management liked, frequently asking awkward questions at 
board meetings.89  
It was poor relations with the financial community which ultimately brought 
about Hay’s downfall.  In the course of 1963, Barings, the Bank of England 
(whose Court of Directors was constituted by the leading merchant banks), 
and other City institutions, such as the investment trusts and insurance 
companies, intervened to force Hay’s resignation. His failure to groom a 
successor and his falling out with virtually all of the Guthrie management and 
directorate was making the group liable to take-over by Malayan Chinese 
interests in combination with American bankers.90 As Hay put it to the 
Governor of the Bank of England in typically dark humour: ‘I was the 
sacrificial lamb – perhaps sheep is the more appropriate word for one so 
mature as myself’.91 Significantly, Hay’s successor as head of Guthrie was a 
figure much more acceptable to the City: the former deputy-governor of 
Kenya, Sir Eric Griffith-Jones, who had also had experience in legal affairs in 
the Malayan Civil Service (from 1946-9).   
Hay’s furious temper and legendary rudeness was perhaps reflective of a 
‘social inferiority complex’ – or, a clash between the more  meritocratic 
culture of Scottish society and the snobbish, class-obsessed England, where 
‘background’ and ‘character’ often counted for far more than ability.92 Errol 
Shearn, the lawyer and legislative councillor in Malaya, who accumulated an 
array of tin and rubber directorships on retiring to London in the 1950s, 
experienced similar difficulties to Hay at the hands of the ‘City slickers in their 
86 Barlow Papers, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge (hereafter Barlow), 21/5, 
Tom Barlow to F. H. Williams, Singapore, 24 April 1946. 
87 Gullick letter 2003. 
88 HSBC archives, London, Chief Manager’s File: Singapore – Private Duplicates, Jan 
1954-Dec 1961, W. H. Lydall, Singapore to Michael W. Turner, Chief Manager, Hong 
Kong, 28 Jan 1957. 
89 Gullick letter 2003. 
90 Material in Bank of England Archive, London (hereafter BoE), G1/183.   
91 Ibid., Hay to Lord Cromer, 11 September 1963.  
92 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 222. 
Page 13 of 27
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/MOH
Management & Organizational History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
14 | P a g e
bowlers’ who made ‘no secret of their view that Shearn was a country bumpkin 
from the sticks’.93   
Yet, Hay’s insecurities must also have derived from the searing experience of 
growing up with his doom-laden father’s Presbyterian religious obsessions, 
and Hay Senior’s failings in business.94 Family impoverishment made it 
impossible for Hay to pursue his childhood ambition of studying at Cambridge 
University and then entering the clergy, and Hay’s first act on becoming 
wealthy was to settle his father’s debts.95 Indeed, class and background was 
not necessarily a factor in Hay’s inability to form close personal relationships: 
he clashed even with fellow self-made man, Sir John Anderson, the head of 
Guthrie during John George’s early career there.  According to Guthrie legend, 
Anderson sacked Hay on his deathbed in 1924.  Guthrie, however, was in 
financial crisis and so the executors begged Hay to stay – he thus became 
general manager in 1925, and exacted his price by becoming one-sixth owner 
of the business.96 
In contemporary parlance, Hay would be dubbed a ‘control freak’, incapable of 
delegating.97 This was the key issue which precipitated Sir John’s final fall 
from grace in 1963. In 1961, nine of the Guthrie companies were reorganised 
under the banner of Guthrie Estates Agency Ltd (GEAL), from which the 
former purchased secretarial and agency services.  Being both chair of the 
component firms, and of GEAL, Hay exercised absolute control (despite being 
78). A boardroom quarrel ensued in 1962, in which Gullick, supposedly Hay’s 
intended successor, fell out with Sir John in such an ‘outrageous manner’ that 
most of the directorate had resigned by June 1963. Gullick’s ‘undoing’ as he 
recalled in 1995 was to demonstrate a ‘wish to alter things’.98  
The only group of employees that Hay enjoyed cordial relations with were the 
planters on the estates.99  But, even there, relations with the men on the spot 
started to go awry in the early-1960s. By the summer of 1963, a director in the 
Barlow group of companies reported from Kuala Lumpur that Hay had 
‘wrecked the Guthrie spirit in the last few years’. For example, charging for 
electric light in estate bungalows had alienated many of the planters. Staff 
nearing retirement were often given the sack on some small pretext, and 
generally Sir John had ‘become dictatorial and impossible to approach’.100 
Nearly all the Guthrie staff in the Kuala Lumpur office cabled their support for 
the resigned London directors in the summer of 1963.101  
93 Gullick, ‘Secretary’, 46  
94 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 223 
95 Ibid.; Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 439, 440; Gullick letter 2003; Orbell, ‘Anderson’. 
96 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 442.   
97 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 226 
98 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 439, 442; Gullick letter 2003. 
99 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 441; TNA, CO 537/5978, Minute of conversation between Hay 
and Sir Thomas Lloyd, 28 March 1950; CO 717/197, letter to Sir Hilton Poynton, CO, 5 
June 1951. 
100 Barlow, 26/1, C. E. ‘Robin’ Hindson to Tom Barlow, 24 June 1963.  
101 Ibid., 9 July 1963. 
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Gullick reflected in later life that it was ‘hard to recall anyone with whom he 
was on terms of real friendship’. Even after 40 years of working together, 
Hay’s deputy on the plantation side, Charles Mann, still called his colleague 
‘Sir John’. For Hay, ‘the satisfaction of inflicting humiliation became a 
corrosive obsession’. 102 Mark Gent, who joined Guthrie’s Company Secretaries 
office in 1952 (later becoming head of the whole business in Kuala Lumpur in 
1969, and successor to Griffith-Jones as chair in London in 1979), described 
Hay as ‘a very curious mixture, who I think would have interested 
psychoanalysts’.  Hay ‘bullied’ his senior staff, typically summoning them to 
his office in the afternoon where they would be ‘harangued, or reduced to jelly, 
for up to 2 hours’.103 Hay suffered no embarrassment in rebuking well-
established senior staff in ‘the East’ either through acid and accusatory 
correspondence – such as in 1936 when under-performance was blamed on 
the failings of the local management, headed by James Robertson (a 
significant figure in Malayan expatriate society since Robertson also served as 
a legislative councillor in Singapore).104 Even in his relatively junior position 
as head of the Companies Department in London, Hay chastised the Malayan 
branches in caustic and sarcastic terms for their apparent shortcomings.  In 
1922, for example, he wrote to Guthrie’s Kuala Lumpur branch, complaining 
about poor information flows on potential plantation land for sale:  
You will recollect that we are 8000 miles away and it is on you we 
must depend for preliminary investigations. It is quite useless your 
sending home details of properties for sale, unless you have first of 
all made preliminary investigations and have satisfied yourselves 
and without much expense you should be able to ascertain some 
reliable information regarding the conditions of the properties 
submitted, the soil, character, labour conditions, transport and past 
history. 
Unless you can give us such information without which it is 
impossible to form any opinion at all, it is quite futile to go on with 
this business.105  
To be fair to Hay, these tantrums were symptomatic of a tortured genius. 
‘Hay’s ability to see the wood for the trees tended to set him apart from his 
peers and contemporaries’.106 Forecasting a world-wide conflagration, a 
classic example was Hay’s conversion to maximum production from 1938 
(after having been the guru of restriction some four years earlier).  This was a 
departure which ‘dumbfounded’ other industry and City leaders, who feared 
massive price instability.107 What further charged Hay’s acrimonious relations 
with imperial and colonial public servants were his very different ‘ideological’ 
visions of development and decolonisation. 
102 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 441, 442. 
103 Gent letter.  
104 GA, G/MIS/9, note of visit to Malaya, 1936; memorandum by Hay, 5 May 1936.  
105 GA, G/COR/16, Hay to Kuala Lumpur, 11 May 1922.  
106 Tate, RGA, 480. 
107 Ibid., 481; Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 264. 
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A Question of Ideology: Hay and the late-colonial state 
Up to a point, Hay continued to be trusted by the Whitehall mandarins.  With 
the outbreak of World War Two in Europe, for example, Hay was asked to 
confidentially discuss with the RGA Council ways and means of securing 
adequate supplies of rubber for the UK.108 By the late-1940s, however, Hay 
was seriously at odds with both the CO and the colonial governments in 
Southeast Asia concerning the role of the state in Malayan economic 
development. Low government-imposed commodity prices, the perceived 
failure of the colonial state to deal effectively with left-wing subversion in 
Malaya, the UK government’s refusal to underwrite an insurance scheme in 
face of the subsequent communist insurgency, and the slow settlement of war-
damage compensation alienated Guthrie’s chief executive from the imperial 
regime.109  
Yet, even before the advent of Attlee’s Labour Government, state meddling 
was not welcomed by Hay. The Stevenson Scheme of the 1920s was dubbed a 
‘first class disaster’.110 Hay was well aware even in 1922 that the Dutch would 
likely not sign up, and Kuala Lumpur was advised to ‘prepare for the worst’, 
marshal resources and cut costs in preparation for unremunerative prices.111 
By 1924 Hay was ‘very interested’ to learn of the Penang Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce’s calls for the restriction programme to be scrapped, and the 
Chinese traders’ advocacy of reduction in taxation as the palliative for rubber’s 
woes.112 Moreover, the restriction programme’s sudden abolition was not what 
Hay agitated for – he pressed instead for a phased withdrawal over four years 
to avoid excessive competition for labour and hence a sudden upsurge in 
overheads. The UK Cabinet ignored these pleas, and the scheme’s immediate 
termination led to a rubber price in December 1928 65 per cent lower than the 
corresponding figure for 12 months previously.113 Hay was livid. 
Hay did forge a ‘close personal relationship’ with Sir John Campbell, 
becoming ‘virtually an integral part of the CO’ in IRRA negotiations.114 Yet, 
this was more a question of convenience rather than conviviality on the part of 
the mandarins since a frequently aired grievance of the officials was that the 
multiplicity of institutions claiming to represent the rubber growers, 
particularly on the spot in Malaya, made it very difficult to gauge a dominant 
industry view.115 Nor did this mean that Whitehall always did what Hay 
wanted.  Concerned about rising NEI indigenous rubber exports, Hay became 
deeply frustrated by delays in the signing of the IRRA in early 1934 and even 
108 RGACM, Ms. 24863/51, 4 Dec 1939.  
109 White, Business, 269. 
110 Tate, RGA, 366. 
111 GA, G/COR/16, Hay to Kuala Lumpur, 6 July and 31 Aug 1922.  
112 GA, G/COR/16, Hay to Singapore, 26 June 1924.  
113 Ibid., 365-6; Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 165. 
114 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 178, 184, 193. 
115 Martin Thomas, Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the 
European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
194. 
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threatened to resign from his bargaining role.116 His earlier cordiality with 
Campbell broke down.117  In the 1937-8 renewal negotiations, the issue of new 
planting caused major frictions between Hay and the CO bureaucrats. Hay 
argued for a ban on new planting, and fretted about inflationary consequences 
on future productive capacity, while the CO insisted a ban was ‘politically 
indefensible’ and that an element of rejuvenation would provide a safety 
blanket to reassure consumers.118  
Although having a reputation as a restrictionist, Hay much preferred laissez-
faire solutions to international economic problems. Hence, in 1933, Hay 
argued that the coming together of production and consumption in the course 
of 1932 through market forces was ‘natural[ly]’ solving the problem of supply 
and demand, and was the ‘sensible approach to equilibrium’ in contrast to the 
‘desperate and highly speculative enterprise’ which was restriction. The 
problems of the Great Depression were largely beyond the primary-producing 
industries per se: they were a consequence rather of political, monetary and 
tariff obstructions to international trade.119 What changed Hay’s mind in 
favour of restriction (which, for him, was only ever conceived as a temporary 
measure) was the predicted upsurge in NEI and Malayan smallholder exports, 
threatening to overwhelm markets and crash prices.120 
Hay’s consistent discourse was that state intervention in the Malayan 
economy should be limited to providing ‘law and order’ while also keeping 
taxes as low as possible. As RGA chairman in 1931, he authored a typical 
tirade against ‘big government’ to the Governor of the Straits Settlements and 
High Commissioner to the Federated Malay States, Sir Cecil Clementi. 
Malayan rubber could best be served in the ‘continued depression’ by a 
reduction in ‘direct Government charges’ upon producers, notably quit rent 
which had been ‘fixed at a time when profits on rubber growing were very 
high’ and which, by the 1930s, represented an ‘item of cost out of all 
proportion to other estate costs’.  Meantime, ‘Medical and Heath charges’ 
needed to be curbed and the ‘most stringent economy… exercised... so that the 
burden on the Industry will be still further lightened’.121  
Under the exigencies of the Emergency and managed decolonisation, the post-
war colonial state increasingly intervened in the rubber industry to secure the 
incomes of indigenous growers. This culminated in the 1955 replanting 
scheme, where grants to replace obsolete trees were funded through an 
additional cess on exports. Redistribution was vociferously opposed by Hay on 
the grounds that the scheme was punishing the ‘efficient’ estates (notably 
Guthrie of course) which had helped themselves by funding their own 
extensive replanting with high-yielding strains since the Second World War. 
For the colonial state, however, and particularly its dynamic and forceful 
116 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 180. 
117 Ibid., 333 n. 178. 
118 Ibid., 300 
119 Ibid., 279 
120 Ibid., 284 
121 RGACM, 24863/31, Appendix to Report of Malaya Committee.  Copy of letter from 
chairman, RGA, 27 May 1931. 
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economic secretary, Oscar Spencer, supported by the CO in London, Malay 
smallholdings and medium-sized Chinese and Indian plantations could not be 
allowed to go under in the joint struggle with Malayan communism and 
American synthetics.122   
For Hay, moreover, while the state was poking its proverbial nose too far into 
business realms that should not concern it, mandarins and ministers were 
doing too little in the areas where they held definite responsibility. Hay’s 
stinging rebukes against government during World War Two as head of the 
joint committee of eastern enterprises was based on a principle that the state 
had failed in its task of physically protecting British lives and property 
overseas through the loss of Malaya to Japan. His Majesty’s Government was 
now reneging on that contract through the Treasury’s suggestions that the 
War Risks Insurance scheme of 1939 should only apply to the British Isles and 
not the overseas territories.123 In similar vein, Hay was frustrated by the 
apparent lack of protection of planters and property during the Emergency 
(euphemism for the colonial war against the Malayan Communist Party 
[MCP]).124 Hay’s refusal to give in on the Japanese Occupation issue 
contributed to the UK government (albeit in a drawn-out fashion) paying 
compensation.125 But Sir John’s influence was less clear on counter-
insurgency policy, which continued to outrage Guthrie’s boss into the self-
government era: Hay was still presenting a gloomy picture of estate security in 
his chairman’s addresses in 1955, given security cutbacks in the wake of falling 
rubber and tin prices at the end of the Korean boom.126 Irrespective of Sir 
John’s cantankerous and confrontational nature, frustration with the state 
was part and parcel of a wider business-government antagonism which went 
back to the beginnings of colonial administration in Malaya: ‘a fitting and 
forceful climax to the ancient and traditional battle between the business 
community of Singapore and Malaya and the mass weight of bureaucracy’. 127 
Hay’s deepest divisions with government during the 1940s and 1950s, 
however, concerned the actions of the US administration, and the failure of 
British diplomacy to get a better deal for Malayan rubber in the post-war US 
market.  Sir John felt a great sense of betrayal during the Second World War 
when, having built up the American stockpile to prosecute the war against 
Japan, the Truman Committee alleged to the US Senate that Malayan and NEI 
producers, via the IRRC, had ‘withheld essential war material for the base 
motive that we wanted more profit for ourselves, or that we were more 
concerned with the future of our plantations than the war effort’.128  Post-war, 
he was further incensed by British government tendencies to appease 
Washington on economic matters. This was typified by the artificially low 
monopsony price of 10d. a pound for natural rubber imposed by the UK 
122 White, Business, 207-9; FCO 141/7479, Note by Spencer, 21 April 1955 enclosing 
draft letter from Spencer to Calver, RGA, April 1955.  
123 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 282-5. 
124 Alex Sutton, The Political Economy of Imperial Relations: Britain, the Sterling Area and 
Malaya, 1945-1960, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 97.  
125 Tate, RGA, 509-10 n. 20. 
126 Ibid., 550, 556, n. 13.  
127 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 284 
128 RGACM, 24863/53, 7 Sept 1942 
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government in the immediate peace in the interests of maintaining good 
financial relations with the Americans (and at a time when massive loans from 
Washington were being negotiated to prop up the tottering British 
economy).129  Moreover, once in the White House, Harry S. Truman continued 
to maintain restrictions on natural rubber usage in the interests of protecting 
strategically important synthetic production in the Cold War.  In June 1949, 
the rubber price was at its lowest price level since the end of World War Two, 
provoking Hay to ‘advise’ the US government, via USB shareholders, that ‘the 
obvious remedy’ was to remove such measures or face the ‘unhappy 
alternative of counter-restrictive measures which a continuance of present 
American policy might beget’. But, it was not until 1955 that the free market in 
rubber in the USA was restored, and American synthetics competed on world 
markets without subsidisation.130 
Hay was not a vocal opponent of political decolonisation , unlike other RGA 
stalwarts. For example, Alan Calver and Sir Eric Miller approached the CO 
after the sweeping UMNO-MCA-MIC victory in the elections for internal self-
government of 1955, alarmed that ‘Alliance candidates in [the] campaign 
pledged their Party to confiscation of European estates and their distribution 
to smallholders’. A feared bogeyman was the left-wing Minister of Agriculture, 
Abdul Aziz bin Ishak.131 Sir John did fret, however, about the rush to 
independence in a situation where ‘there did not exist the indigenous 
personnel qualified to administer the Government of a modern state’.132 Bad 
governance might also have economic implications in terms of ill-conceived 
pro-indigenous policies.  Hay regarded smallholder competition as a menace 
and in the 1930s depicted ‘native’ growers as persons of ‘limited mentality’ 
with an ‘inability’ to produce ‘regular and adequate supplies of rubber’. As 
such, Hay fit into a European milieu of ‘conservative and often deprecatory 
attitudes’ towards indigenous business and technical capabilities. This led on 
to production quotas in the Stevenson and IRRA schemes which under-
assessed Southeast Asia’s smallholders.133 Such were the cultural mores of 
late-colonialism, which also served Hay’s particular business interest.134  
Nevertheless, Sir John ‘was ready to move with the times’, recognising ‘the 
inevitable shift in decision-making to the East’.135 Guthrie’s estate welfare was 
generally of a high quality, and the emphasis in the 1950s on improving 
labourer’s housing represented a private sector ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaign.136 Meantime, Guthrie was ahead of the game in introducing a cadet 
scheme for the promotion of Malay plantation managers in 1953 (the same 
year that General Templer, High Commissioner and Director of Operations, 
129 White, Business, 77-8. 
130 Ibid., 181; Tate, RGA, 564. 
131 TNA, FCO 141/7479, Telegram from CO to Governor Singapore, 17 Aug 1955. 
132 RGACM, 64, 15 April 1954, Report of Malaya Committee, 4.  
133 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 295, 298-9. 
134 Ibid., 285, 287. 
135 Gullick, ‘Recollection’, 440-1. 
136 Parkinson, Flagship, 117. 
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announced his plan for phased self-government from district to state to 
federal level).137  
Yet, in practice, this localisation proved limited and did not extend to the 
agency in Kuala Lumpur or the boards of either Guthrie or its estate 
companies.138 Moreover, Hay had a blind spot regarding the development of 
moderate non-communist trade unionism in Malaya, which government saw 
as a key element in its ‘hearts and minds’ strategy to undercut the Malayan 
Communist Party. Whitehall was infuriated by Sir John’s rigid sticking to pre-
war notions of paternalism as the best means of controlling labour unrest. 
Indeed, Guthrie (and H&C) obstructionism in recognising the government-
promoted unions was regarded in 1951 by the CO as having an ‘extremely 
damaging effect on the peaceful and effective development of the territory’.139 
As late as April 1954, Hay told his RGA council colleagues that he remained 
sceptical about recognising a ‘primitive labour community’ still vulnerable to 
‘a hard core of communist leadership which might seek other means of 
expression than through violence’.  In November 1957, Hay opposed the plans 
of the RGA’s special representative in Malaya to collaborate with the National 
Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW) in the campaign against takeover bids 
and the fragmentation of estates because ‘the natural political tendency of 
Trade Unions would be to press for Government to take over the industry’. 
Hay also argued that wage negotiations with the NUPW would push up costs, 
impairing the ability of natural rubber to compete with its synthetic rival.140  
Sir John always set out to be pleasant towards Malayan ministers during his 
annual inspection tours of the Southeast Asian branches and plantations.141 
But when full independence for the Federation came in 1957, Hay was quickly 
at loggerheads with Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Commerce and Industry, over 
London’s (i.e. the RGA’s) representation in Malayan delegations to 
International Rubber Study Group meetings. It was Hay’s contention that 
direct RGA representation was needed because the City controlled the 
majority of capital in the rubber industry and had expertise in marketing. Tan, 
however, argued that the RGA was adequately represented through its existing 
membership of the multi-racial Rubber Producers’ Council (RPC) in Kuala 
Lumpur. The minister was so incensed by Hay’s interventions that he had to 
be restrained by his officials into not reconstituting the RPC to permanently 
exclude the RGA.142 Hay’s inability to trust international rubber diplomacy to 
the RPC and Tan’s officials demonstrated a crass insensitivity to Malayan 
nationalism and aspirations to economic independence. Indeed, Hay’s 
tendency to ‘send up’ the ‘hackles’ of Malayan power-brokers, and his 
137 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 301. 
138 Shakila Yacob and Nicholas J. White, ‘The “unfinished business” of Malaysia’s 
decolonisation: the origins of the Guthrie “Dawn Raid”’, Modern Asian Studies, 44, 5 
(2010): 919-959, p. 927. 
139 TNA, CO 859/185/3, Minute by Watson for Higham, 20 April 1951; Minute by 
Higham, 27 April 1951; Higham to Gurney, 22 May 1951. 
140 RGACM, 24863/64, 15 April 1954, Report of Malaya Committee; RGACM, 24863/68, 4 
November 1957; interview with Straits Times, 4 February 1958. 
141 Gullick letter 2003. 
142 RGACM, 24863/68, 6 June 1958. 
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unilateralist tendency to  air grievances in public via annual company 
meetings (often reported in the London and Malayan press), was considered a 
major threat to wider British interests in the delicate post-independence 
situation (by officials and commercials alike).143 
Hay’s MREOC had started the rot with Malayan Chinese business leaders, 
notably Tan Siew Sin, son of the leading rubber entrepreneur and Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) founder, Tan Cheng Lock. Tan senior, as a 
legislative councillor and influential towkay (Chinese community-cum- 
business leader), proved a vociferous critic of the alleged European bias in the 
operation of the IRRA of the 1930s (which, of course, Hay was a principal 
architect and executor).144 Such individuals would become highly-influential 
in post-colonial Malayan politics. To suspicious Asian business leaders, the 
MREOC looked like an attempt to concentrate control of the industry in the 
hands of the largest European-owned agency houses. As Tan Siew Sin 
commented in exile in India there would be opposition from the Malayan 
Chinese to ‘any policy that may tend to develop any kind or form of 
monopolistic capitalism concentrating the control of big business in the hands 
of a very few groups belonging to any one dominant class or race’.145 The 
Overseas Chinese Association in India, what effectively became the MCA in 
post-war Malaya, was funded clandestinely by Walter Fletcher, the rubber 
merchant who had been tasked by HMG to economically subvert Japanese-
occupied Asia and pave the way for a restoration of British interests.  
Indicative of the marginalisation of Hay and his committee of Far Eastern 
business interests in London during World War Two, Fletcher praised the 
dynamism of the exiled Malayan Chinese entrepreneurs in contrast to ‘the 
armchair planners who devote their time solely to schemes for working up 
their previous properties for their own financial gain after others have done 
the harder and more meritorious work entailed by the process of 
reconquest’.146 Hay’s provocations must be seen as a major spur to Malayan 
Chinese ‘nationalism’, and the acceleration of decolonisation as the towkay 
attempted to manage both Malay economic nationalism and British neo-
colonialism. Tan Siew Sin would go on to play a leading role in the 
Malaysianisation of the British agency houses in the 1970s and 1980s.147  
Hay’s stubborn insistence on London being the policy-maker for the rubber 
industry had a long pedigree. He had limited truck with the United Plantation 
Association of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, despite its European leadership, 
which he blamed for a failure to convince the colonial administration to 
143 Nicholas J. White, British Business in Post-colonial Malaysia, 1957-70: ‘Neo-colonialism’ 
or ‘Disengagement’?, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, 212; TNA, DO 35/9901, G. W. 
Tory, High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur to A. W. Snelling, Commonwealth Relations 
Office, 23 Feb 1959. 
144 K. G. Tregonning, ‘Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 10, 1 (March 1979); 25-76, p. 44. 
145 Tate, RGA, 502. 
146 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Library, Singapore, Tan Cheng Lock papers, 
TCL/III/20, Fletcher to Tan Cheng Lock, 30 January 1943.  
147 Shakila and White, ‘Dawn Raid’, 952-3 
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reduce taxes and other government exactions during 1936.148 Hay was 
opposed to the creation of a local rubber regulation committee in the renewal 
negotiations for the IRRA in 1937-8. He was overruled, however, by the CO on 
the grounds that ‘there are considerable interests in the rubber industry which 
are not fully represented in [London], e.g. the Chinese estates and 
smallholders’.149 The tensions with Tan Siew Sin were also consistent with 
Hay’s defence of the ‘open’ colonial economy or what Hay specifically called 
‘free economic cooperation’ between Britain and post-independence Malaya. 
Despite political independence, minimal changes should be made to the long-
established colonial export economy – capital should be allowed to flow 
unimpeded within the Commonwealth and head offices (and the ultimate 
control of investments) should continue to reside in the City of London.150 Hay 
was equally averse, however, to letting the merchant bankers, insurance 
brokers and fund managers of the City of London have a say in the 
management and organisation of his businesses. 
A Question of Strategy: Hay and The City 
Hay’s troubles with the City arose from differences of opinion regarding how 
to best cope with decolonisation. Up to the mid-1950s, the big City institutions 
were not much involved with Guthrie. The merchant bank, Kleinwort Benson, 
occasionally provided credits to finance exports alongside the eastern 
exchange banks during the 1920s.151 But the merchant banks, insurance 
companies and investment trusts of London did not play ‘any significant part’ 
in Guthrie’s capitalisation – shares in the individual operating companies, all 
separately listed on the stock exchange, were held by a myriad of  ‘colonels’ 
widows, by parsons and business men, by artisans and country squires’.152 
Indeed, contrary to Stillson’s analysis (which Wilkins relied upon), Drabble 
and Drake argued that it was the agency houses, not the London merchant 
banks or issuing houses, which played the dominant role in promoting 
British-incorporated Malayan rubber companies in the early-twentieth 
century.153  Companies floated through the ‘highly regarded’ agency houses 
were more likely to command a premium on their share flotations given ‘the 
extra valuation attached by investors in a free market to the shares of those 
companies which benefited from the local knowledge of the agency houses’, 
while ‘subsequent history’ demonstrated that ‘the companies sponsored by the 
agency houses were, in the main, successfully launched and did survive’.154 
Guthrie, moreover, was not a public company but was owned principally by 
the Anderson family (and was registered in Singapore not London). Guthrie’s 
148 RGACM, Ms. 24863/44, 4 May 1936.   
149 Drabble, 187, 191-2. 
150 TNA, DO 35/9905, copy of chairman’s address to USB AGM, 4 June 1958; Straits 
Times, 7 Feb 1958.  
151 GA, G/COR/16, Hay to Singapore, 11 and 25 May and 13 July 1922.  
152 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, 309. 
153 Richard T. Stillson, ‘The Financing of Malayan Rubber, 1905-1923’, Economic History 
Review, 24 (1971): 589-98, pp 593-4; Wilkins, ‘Free-standing company, 1870-1914’, 
269; Drabble and Drake, ‘Financing’, 113-116 
154 Ibid., 115. This fits the experience of ‘free-standing’ tea companies in India where 
longevity was correlated with agency house association.  Wilkins, ‘Revisited’, 29.  
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planters were generally recruited from north of the Tweed, rather than the 
heartland of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in the Home Counties surrounding 
London. Moreover, when ‘public’ capital was raised by Hay it would often be 
in Edinburgh not London – as in the securing of finance for USB’s 
expansionary phase in the 1920s.155  
With the rise of the take-over bidder in the 1950s and 1960s, however, the City 
started to take more interest in Guthrie, a situation not welcomed by Sir John 
who was used to running the business solo. London’s institutional investors 
arrived late to the party of colonial capitalism in Asia. But they played an 
increasingly influential role as the imperial system unravelled. Often 
concerned with short-term profit maximisation in the interest of their 
investors, fund managers and merchant banks were a far cry from the passive 
mass of individual shareholders, the so-called ‘widows and orphans’, that Hay 
was used to.156  Hay’s Guthrie Investment Trust Scheme of 1956 was opposed 
by these more aggressive interests. Sir John’s plan was to pool the massive 
cash reserves of the Guthrie plantation companies (accumulated to finance 
replanting given Hay’s paranoia about a repetition of the 1930s downturn).157 
This, it was hoped, would fend off Malayan Chinese asset-strippers, who had 
emerged as a menace for City-based rubber companies given the fall in the 
rubber price from the heights of the Korean War boom, the rise of synthetic 
competition, and the land hunger of the Malayan peasantry. The tendency for 
share values not to match the price at which a company’s estates could be sold 
was exacerbated, meanwhile, by the uncertainties induced by the approach to 
independence. Overseas Chinese financiers could control companies through 
a mere 40 per cent shareholding since few of the smaller shareholders cast 
their votes at general meetings.  ‘[T]he scheme was designed to put a stop to 
little rubber companies being taken over by raiders’ who ‘smelt development 
potential’.158 The Investment Trust would create a centralised fund which a 
predator of a single company could not easily access. The City institutions, 
however, were strongly opposed to a scheme for putting part of a listed 
company’s assets beyond the control of its dominant shareholders. 
‘Gentlemanly capitalist’ opinion, reflected in the press and among 
stockbrokers, torpedoed Hay’s scheme.159 The growing influence of the 
financiers in Guthrie’s affairs was revealed further in 1963 when the 
Committee of City Investment and Insurance Interests gave their support to 
the four dissident directors, and argued that Sir John should resign because 
he had lost the confidence of major shareholders. This vote of no confidence in 
Hay was described by the London Sunday Times as ‘one of the strongest 
criticisms ever launched in the city on the chairman of a large group’.160 A 
Guthrie manager in Kuala Lumpur subsequently proved correct in his 
155 Parkinson, Flagship. 
156Geoffrey Jones, ‘Business Groups Exist in Developed Markets Also: Britain since 1850’, 
Harvard Business School Working Paper, 16-066 (November 2015), 17, 20-1.  
157 Gullick letter 2003.  
158 Gent letter. 
159 Letters from John Gullick to the author, 21 July 2001 and 18 March 2003; 
‘Recollection’, 440; ‘Secretary’, 49. 
160 Cited in Straits Times, 24 July 1963.  
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prediction in August 1963 that ‘the Investment Trusts would get Sir John out 
by the end of the year’.161  
The view of Hay as a rogue ‘lone wolf’ was compounded by a general belief in 
the Square Mile that Sir John was over-optimistic about the future of 
Southeast Asia.  Hay’s Times obituary of 27 May 1964 commented that: ‘Some 
may feel he held on too long to the belief in the supremacy of natural rubber in 
the face of the encroaching competition of the synthetic product’. At Sir John’s 
death, Guthrie was far less diversified than H&C or the Borneo Company Ltd. 
(later part of the Inchcape Group). Diversification, either geographically or by 
product, was a fashionable notion in the City of the 1950s and 1960s, 
apparently offering a happy escape from the risks of having all one’s eggs in 
one basket. For the Southeast Asian agency houses, it typically involved 
investment in the ‘White’ Commonwealth of Australasia and North America or 
in settler-dominated east and central Africa.162  If diversification succeeded, it 
was expected that the lower risk would enhance the share values on the 
London Stock Exchange, reducing vulnerability to a takeover at a price 
unrelated to the realizable value of the assets. Hay, however, was dead set 
against this policy, believing firmly that the ‘cobbler should stick to his last’. 
An efficient plantation group with interests in one region would lose its 
competitive advantages.163   
Hay had made up his mind about the ill-wisdom of redeployment in the inter-
war years, through opposing Eric Miller’s designs for plantation companies 
investing in the use of natural rubber as an ingredient in the surfacing UK 
roads. Hay’s opposition to diversification also belied Hay’s insecurity – he 
might lose control of ventures in which he had insufficient technical 
knowledge.164 Yet, Hay’s rejection of diversification made the Bank of England 
increasingly concerned at Guthrie’s vulnerability to take-over.165 Threadneedle 
Street lent its assistance in the formation of holding companies for Barlow 
(Highlands & Lowlands) and the Rubber Estate Agency of London (KL-
Kepong) in the late-1950s and early-1960s to avoid such a nightmare 
scenario.166 But the Guthrie Group in the early-1960s was still knit together by 
a ‘charismatic’ rather than ‘bureaucratic’ management structure, and was 
barely moving from ‘owner-entrepreneurship’ to ‘managerial capitalism’. The 
latter was already evident in the rise of the multinational enterprise which 
accompanied political independence in Africa, and in the case of H&C  in Asia 
which from as early as 1916 enjoyed a team management system rather than 
161 Barlow, 26/1, Hindson to Barlow, 16 August 1963.  
162 White, Business, ch. 6; White, Post-colonial, 204-5; Jones and Wale, ‘Diversification’, 
79-81; Jones, Merchants, ch. 5; Nicholas J. White, ‘The diversification of colonial 
capitalism: British agency houses in Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 1960s’ in Ian 
Cook et al. (eds.), Dynamic Asia: Business, Trade and Economic Development in Pacific 
Asia, Aldershot: Ashgate 1998, 12-40. 
163 Gullick letter 2003; Shakila and White, ‘Dawn Raid’, 926. 
164 Gullick letter 2003. 
165 BoE, G1/183, note by L. P. T. Thompson-McCausland for O’Brien and the Governor, 14 
Oct 1963. 
166 White, Post-colonial, 9. 
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domination by a single over-bearing ‘heroic’ personality.167 As such, by 1963, 
once ‘the old man’ was perceived as ‘having lost his grip’ at Guthrie, ‘the 
managers who used to support Sir John [had] few good words to say for 
him’.168 
After Hay’s downfall, a new holding company, The Guthrie Corporation 
Limited (GCL), was formed in 1965, with Barings as financial advisers. Much 
tighter control over the plantation companies by the Guthrie board, rather 
than via the interlocking directorships of an individual like Hay, was now 
possible. Moreover, this reorganization left ultimate control of all the Guthrie 
plantation companies in the hands of the shareholders of the holding 
company (and so did not raise the City’s hackles unlike Hay’s Investment 
Trust project a decade earlier).169 The upper-class Griffith-Jones, brought in 
by the Bank of England to head up GCL, set about diversifying into UK 
industrials, particularly ‘looking at end uses of rubber, hence the carpet 
companies etc.’170 
Conclusion 
Despite the alleged ‘closed worlds’ of the City and officialdom, and the 
apparent ascendancy of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, Hay’s career points to the 
entrepreneurial opportunities and upward mobility provided by the UK’s 
Southeast Asian empire for Britons with limited monetary means (and  for 
those lacking social capital as well). Hay became ‘moneyed’ but never 
‘gentlemanly’. Simultaneously, however, the uncomfortable relationship 
prevailing between Hay and the Whitehall mandarins was indicative of a 
disconnect between the imperial business and the imperial governance of late-
colonialism. Despite Hay’s intimacy with CO mandarins during the IRRA 
negotiations of the 1930s, and his being party to the ‘second colonial 
occupation’ of the 1940s (through membership of the MPU, CEAC, and RCC), 
Hay’s brand of rugged individualism was increasingly out of sync with the 
‘development-and-welfare’ rhetoric of the late-colonial state. At CEAC, Hay 
sat alongside a genuine City gent, Sir William Goodenough, chairman of 
Barclays Bank DCO (Dominion, Colonial & Overseas), a second-generation 
banker, and product of Wellington College and Oxford.  The contrast with Sir 
John was also striking in terms of the ease with which Sir William 
accommodated himself to Labour’s new imperialism. Barclays established its 
own development corporation in Africa and the Caribbean in 1946 which 
acted as an exemplar, precursor and complement to the state-run Colonial 
Development Corporation post-1948.171   
167 A. G. Hopkins, ‘Imperial Business in Africa – Part II: Interpretations’, Journal of African 
History, 17, 2 (1976): 267-90, citation at 280, 281; Jones and Wale, ‘Diversification’, p. 
81; idem., ‘Business Groups’, 400-1. 
168 Barlow, 26/1, Hindson to Barlow, 29 July 1963.  
169 Gullick letter 2003. 
170 Gent letter. 
171 Billy Frank, ‘The Formation of British Colonial Development Policy in the Trans-
World War Two Period, 1942-53: With Special Reference to Central and Southern 
Africa’, PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 2003.
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Hay’s vexatious personality deprived Malaya’s British-owned rubber industry 
of genuine influence over the state. Moreover, government decision-making 
throughout Hay’s long reign as rubber’s ‘uncrowned king’ was largely 
autonomous of big business. It was geared not to the invisible earnings of Sir 
John and his ilk, but to wider imperial trading advantages given the crucial 
role of Malaya in the Anglo-American balance of trade, constantly moving in 
the latter’s favour.172 Between 1937 and 1941, for example, rubber exports 
totalled US$590 million, not far short of exports by domestic industries from 
Britain to the US worth $620 million.173 As Hay incisively appreciated in 1940, 
the benefits of his enterprise in persuading the American authorities to build 
up a huge rubber stockpile ‘will not go to those who produce and those who 
sell’.  Given the provisions of the wartime Excess Profits Tax, ‘the whole of the 
benefit goes back to Government’. Rather, ‘we are providing a commodity 
which more than any other is the most valuable means of winning dollar 
exchange and which is so necessary for the purchase of war equipment, the 
adequate provision of which is vital to our whole security’.174 This macro-
economic and geo-strategic concern, on the part of HMG, was even more 
acute in the post-World War Two era, following the convertibility crisis of 
1947 and the devaluation of the pound two years’ later. As Sir John realised in 
October 1949: ‘In the present circumstances Government were not concerned 
with the profitability of rubber to individual producers – they were only 
concerned with its dollar-earning capacity’.175 In the late-1950s, Malaya was 
still contributing at least one-quarter of the total dollars accruing to the whole 
sterling area.  Protecting this vital source of hard currency and lessening the 
international strain on sterling (rather than conserving substantial British 
investments or invisible earnings from shipping, banking and insurance) was 
the key financial asset that British policy-makers sought to preserve through 
managed decolonisation.176  
Moreover, Hay’s economic rapaciousness was always tempered by 
government fears of peasant and labour unrest – a key consideration, for 
example, in the rapid ending of restriction in 1928 and the production quotas 
post-1934.177 Hay’s lead in repatriating Indian labour in the 1930s was not 
appreciated by the MCS officers who had to face ‘the brickbats of the mob’ in 
Madras, or the mud-slinging of India’s nationalist politicians.178 Despite 
Thomas’s general depiction of a government-business ‘hand-in-glove’ compact 
in the running of Malaya’s inter-war rubber industry, penny-pinching 
attitudes, epitomised by the payment of ‘starvation wages’, infuriated the 
colonial administration’s labour officers (concerned as they were with the 
preservation of social peace).179 In 1931, Hay’s rubber restriction plan, based 
upon a combination of taxation and compensation inducements, was rejected 
172 White, Business, 11-12, 212-3; Sutton, Political Economy, 55-127. 
173 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 300. 
174 RGACM, 24863/52, 2 December 1940, appendix.  
175 RGACM, 24863/61, 3 Oct 1949. 
176 Sutton, Political Economy, 154.  
177 Drabble, Malayan Rubber, 170, 185, 190. 
178 Cunyngham-Brown, Traders, p. 256.  
179 Thomas, Violence, 194-5.  
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by the CO given the ‘fatal political objection’ that ‘the main burden of taxation 
would fall on Asian producers whilst the bulk of the compensation would go to 
Europeans’.180 This sensitivity towards the interests of the smaller indigenous 
growers, as well as the plantation labour force, would become an intensified 
official priority in the battle to win ‘hearts and minds’ during the communist 
insurgency after 1948.181  
Rather than the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ paradigm, the Hay experience points 
to an older historiographical tradition in the management and organisation of 
Empire. Echoing Robinson & Gallagher on imperial expansion in the 
nineteenth century, Stockwell has argued that the ‘official mind’ of 
decolonisation ‘took account of economic interests but [was] neither valet to 
“gentlemanly capitalists” or chambers of commerce’.182 ‘Gentlemanly 
capitalism’ did eventually flex its muscles in bringing about Hay’s downfall in 
1963 and the reorganisation of Guthrie that followed. Paradoxically, however, 
this occurred in the post-colonial age as the big City institutions finally woke 
up to the potentials of (and threats to) sprawling assets in Southeast Asia 
accumulated in the colonial era.  Post-Hay, the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ of the 
City played a major role, both wittingly and unwittingly, in the end of Guthrie 
as a British-controlled entity. The Barings-advised Guthrie board infuriated 
Malaysian shareholders by intensifying its geographical diversification 
through profits earned in Malaysia. The government-linked corporation, 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), closely assisted by Rothschilds and the 
stockbrokers, Rowe & Pitman, launched a successful ‘Dawn Raid’ on Guthrie 
on the London Stock Exchange in September 1981. Crucial to this lightning 
takeover was the decision of the M&G Investment Trust to sell its stake in 
Guthrie to PNB at the very favourable offer price of £9.01 per share.183 The 
Guthrie plantations were subsequently split off from the rest of the business, 
the latter being disposed of in London in 1988.184 Kumpulan Guthrie, 
alongside the Malaysianised H&C assets, was finally fused with Sime Darby in 
a ‘mega merger’ of Malaysian-owned plantations in 2007 to create the world’s 
largest listed oil palms plantation company.185      
180 Ibid., 273-4 
181  Nicholas J. White, ‘The Frustrations of Development: British Business and the Late 
Colonial State in Malaya, 1945-57, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 28, 1 (March 
1997): 103-119; idem., ‘The limits of late-colonial intervention: labour policy and the 
development of trade unions in 1950s Malaya’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 36, 106 
(November 2008): 429-450.   
182 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 
London: Macmillan, 1961, 20-21; A. J. Stockwell, ‘Ending the British Empire: What did 
they think they were doing?’, Royal Holloway Inaugural Lecture Series, 1999, 16. 
183 Shakila and White, ‘Dawn Raid’.  
184 Asiaweek, 20 May 1988, 54. 
185 Tun Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid, Given in Trust: Tun Ahmad Sarji Memoirs, Kuala 
Lumpur: MPH Publishing, 2011, 550-1.  
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